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I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
When the United Kingdom (UK) joined the European Union (EU)
in 1972, a world like today’s was hardly imaginable: Over the decades,
Europe withstood the Cold War, and in 1989 the fall of the Berlin Wall
sounded the bell for a new era, making the way free for the Union’s
eastward enlargement. European citizens 2 live in an extraordinarily
connected world, where frontiers, customs, different currencies and
even national citizenship within the European Union were of less
importance.3 However, recent developments have led to a new focus
and different interpretations of those achievements. The Europe of
today faces many challenges, starting with political issues such as
financial instability in Greece, migration and its consequences for the
Schengen Agreement,4 a strong right-wing movement in almost every
European country and, of course, the questions regarding the future of
Europe after Brexit.
The outcome of the referendum of 23 June 2016,5 leading to the
initiation of a Brexit whose details still remain to be defined, certainly
marks an important turning point within the history of the European
Union. The fear that all the political, legal and economic achievements
2. As of February 28, the EU consists of 28 Member States: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
3. See European Parliament Eurobarometer, European Youth in 2016 (May 21, 2016),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/eurobarometre/2016/eye2016/eb85_1_eye_2016_analytical
_overview_en.pdf at 18 & 15 ( showing that 90% of the respondents say that it is important for
young European to learn about the EU and how its institutions work,; however, a large majority
of young Europeans (61%) do not want to study, undergo training or work in another EU country
whereas only 32% would like to do so.); see also European Commission, Erasmus Impact Study
of
2014,
at
14,
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/education_culture/repository/education/
library/study/2014/erasmus-impact_en.pdf (17.02.2017) (according to which those students who
have participated in the international exchange program are better positioned to find their first
job).
4. The Schengen acquis - Agreement between the Governments of the States of the
Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the
gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, 2000 O.J. L 239, http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:42000A0922(01)&from=EN
(13.02.2017). In the so-created Schengen Area, international border checks have largely been
abolished.
5. EU Referendum, results, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.com/news/politics/eu_
referendum/results. The referendum yielded 17,410.742 (51.9%) votes to leave and 16,141.241
(48.1%) votes to remain.
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of the past decades will disappear and be replaced by archaic and longforgotten methods and strategies is present and real. And indeed it does
not help that the political and legal evolution of this process is more
than a little uncertain. However, the general direction has been shaped
by British Prime Minister Theresa May, who declared on 17 January
2017 that she is willing to negotiate the conditions of what is termed a
‘hard Brexit’, meaning thereby the UK’s unequivocal departure from
the European Single Market by 2019. Accordingly, the notice required
under Art. 50 TEU6 was given on 29 March 2017.7 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court had to decide whether it was permissible for notice to
be given without the consent of the British Parliament.8 The subsequent
judgment of 24 January 2017 was decided by a majority of eight to
three. The judges pointed out that a decision of such importance
includes a considerable amount of lost rights for the British people. The
Court therefore stated that for the Government to trigger Art. 50 TEU,
both chambers of the UK’s Parliament had to authorize the process
beforehand with an Act of Parliament.9
Acknowledging the importance of the forthcoming two years of
negotiations, the final objective for both sides should include a
comprehensive agreement that provides legal certainty rather than the
radical effect of leaving the EU without any further arrangements.

6. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2012 O.J. C 326/13
[hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon]; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union 2012 O.J. C 326/47 [hereinafter TFEU]; Consolidated version of the Treaty on
European Union - Protocols - Declarations annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental
Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, signed on December 13, 2007 - Tables of
equivalences, 2012 O.J. C 326/1, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML
/?uri=CELEX:12012M/TXT&from=EN. As a subsequence of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Treaty
on European Union is one of the two primary treaties and forms the basis of EU law, stating
legal principles and regulating the individual institutions.
7. See Article 50: Theresa May statement to MPs as letter delivered, ʙʙᴄ ɴᴇᴡs (Mar. 29,
2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-39434293; see also Theresa May, Prime Minister,
United Kingdom, Speech: The Government’s Negotiating Objectives for Exiting the EU (Jan.
17,
2017),
available
at
https://www.gov.uk/government/
speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-speech.
8. Michael Gordon, Brexit: a challenge for the UK constitution, of the UK constitution?,
12 E.C.L. REV. 409, 422 (2016).
9. R (on the application of Yalland) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union
[2017] EWHC 630 (Admin) at 48. The ‘Brexit Bill’ passed both chambers of Parliament on 14
March 2017. The Amendments introduced by the House of Lords were not adopted.

1478 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40:5

II. EUROPEAN CONSUMER LAW – SETTING THE SCENE
The legal and economic consequences of a Brexit are hard to
determine as its uncertainty has a strong impact on several areas of
consumers’ and businesses’ daily lives. Economically, new customs
and migration agreements will be required, as well as new
arrangements regarding commerce and related fields, to name only a
few examples.
All these aspects are connected to many different fields of law –
a fact that makes the upcoming negotiations even harder. EU law – in
all its complexity – has been a part of the UK’s national legislation for
a long time. To untangle the cobweb will therefore represent one of the
most challenging tasks during and after negotiations between the EU
and the UK. Several options have been presented over the past months.
But questions such as whether the UK will follow the example of
Norway10 or Switzerland,11 or whether it will remain a ‘third party’ or
10. See Kaiser, Auf dem Weg zum “Brexit”, Die Europäische Union im britischen
Verfassungsrecht, 6 EUR 593, 605 et seq. (2016). Since Norway is part of the European Free
Trade Association (“EFTA”) as well as a member of the European Economic Area (“EEA”), its
relationship to the EU has to be distinguished from the arrangements of the EU and Switzerland.
According to its EEA-membership, Norway has to adopt a certain part of EU secondary law
without having a participation right. Moreover, Norway is obliged to accept the jurisdiction of
the EFTA-court as well as the competences of the EFTA-supervising agency. The most
important point of the EEA is the elimination of customs duties and the adoption of almost 80
percent of the acquis communautaire. Nevertheless, the EEA is not a customs union with a
common customs tariff. In conclusion, Norway is probably the closest partner of the EU that is
not part of it, considering its access to the internal market. As “consideration” for this access,
Norway has to pay a “cohesion fee” every five years (~ 1.8 billion €). Given the British attempt
to achieve a ‘hard Brexit’, the model seems unlikely to be followed.
11. See Astrid Epiney, Die Beziehungen Schweiz-EU als Modell für die Gestaltung des
Verhältnisses Großbritanniens zur EU, in BREXIT: DIE JURISTISCHEN FOLGEN 77, 79 (Malte
Kramme, Christian Baldus, Martin Schmidt-Kessel eds., Baden-Baden: Nomos 2017).
Compared to treaties of the EU with “regular” third countries, the relationship between
Switzerland and the EU is based on several international law treaties that contain a lot more
specifications. This also follows from the Swiss location in the center of Europe and its EFTAmembership the EFTA was first developed to act as a counterbalance to the EU, since it was
founded by Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Iceland, Great Britain and Denmark. As
opposed to Norway and to the other EFTA-countries, Switzerland is not part of the EEA. Hence,
Switzerland is not as integrated in the internal market as the aforementioned countries.
Nevertheless, Switzerland adopted a huge part of the EU acquis communautaire: The
relationship between both parties consists of two overarching treaties which include regulations
concerning, inter alia, the free movement of people, participation in the Dublin- (considering
migration) and Schengen-acquis, air transport and agriculture. Each treaty comprises varying
agreements on specific areas. These can be distinguished in cooperation agreements (slight
commitment), harmonization agreements (more intense commitment) and integration
agreements (intense commitment) such as the Schengen agreement and the Dublin regime.
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come up with an individual solution can hardly be predicted and are
therefore not subjects of this contribution. Too many variables are part
of this massive equation and too many decisions are still pending.
Given this background, this paper aims to draw a picture of possible
consequences for consumer law in the EU as well as in the UK. Before
doing so, we must outline some of the more general aspects of
European consumer law and its importance for European contract law
and hence the free internal market.
A. European Provisions
European law aims to achieve the historically developed idea of a
‘united Europe’.12 As a consequence, both the general idea of uniform
provisions for all Member States and the preservation of national
sovereignty13 have to be combined in a practicable way. It follows that
the result is a highly complex legal framework that has to be accepted
and executed by all Member States. The structure of EU law
distinguishes between primary law, in its core consisting of the TEU
and the TFEU, 14 and secondary law. Primary law sets out the EU
principals, institutions and competencies, whereas secondary law
governs further specific legislative areas. The central provision in this
respect is Art. 288 TFEU, providing for different instruments, as there
are regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions.15
European consumer law is primarily regulated through directives and
to a minor extent through regulations.16
Both directives and regulations are suitable for simultaneously
assuring uniformity and sovereignty. Regulations have a general
application. Their legal provisions are binding and enter into force on
the specified determined date. In order to develop a consistent
12. DAMIAN CHALMERS, GARETH DAVIES & GIORGIO MONTI, EUROPEAN UNION LAW
7 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed. 2014).
13. TEU post-Lisbon supra note 6, art.4, 5.
14. TFEU, supra note 6. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union is the
second primary treaty. It sets forth a detailed basis of EU law as well as the scope of the EU’s
competencies.
15. Ruffert, Art. 288 TFEU, in EUV/AEUV – COMMENTARY 15 (Calliess & Ruffert
eds., München: C.H. Beck , 5th ed. 2016). Moreover, the provision binds the EU institutions as
well as the Member States, as far as they are addressed. Cf. Cʜᴀʟᴍᴇʀs, Dᴀᴠɪᴇs & Mᴏɴᴛɪ, supra
note 12, at 112).
16 . Cf. MICKLITZ, STUYCK & TERRYN, CONSUMER LAW 58 et seq. (Oxford, Hart
Publishing, 2010). While European consumer law is primarily regulated through directives, the
general principles of EU law are important for the shaping and interpretation of consumer law.
See generally TFEU, supra note 6, art. 169.
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application of provisions throughout the EU, they do not need to be
transposed into national law. Consequently, they offer a high standard
of uniformity and are used where this requirement is of crucial
importance.17 Despite operating within the EU’s legal competencies,
they also interfere with the Member State’s sovereignty to a certain
extent. Therefore, directives provide a different and important option.
They are also binding, but only regarding the result to be achieved. It
is up to the individual countries to devise their own laws on how to
reach these goals. 18 This option gives Member States the important
decisional power on how to implement the provisions and how to make
sure that they will fit in the national system. To adjust the respective
outcomes, the differentiation of full harmonization and minimum
harmonization directives is highly important. Minimum harmonization
directives provide for a minimum standard that Member States have to
meet, but for which they are free to introduce or maintain a higher level
of protection. In contrast, full harmonization directives do not provide
this option. Their standards are binding so that Member States are not
allowed to deviate at all. The differentiation between regulations and
full and minimum harmonization directives plays a very important role
in consumer law, especially since the different Member States pursue
different approaches as to where consumer law should be located
within their respective legal systems and Member States generally
prefer to have some leeway as to how to implement national rules.19
The scope of the individual consumer law provisions is very
diverse and a considerable amount of legislation has been passed.
Important regulations tackling consumer law include: the Rome I
Regulation, 20 the Brussels Ia Regulation, 21 the Air Passenger Rights

17 . For further argumentation, see Dorota Lecykiewicz & Stephen Weatherill, The
Images of the Consumer in EU Law, in THE IMAGES OF THE CONSUMER IN EU LAW:
LEGISLATION, FREE MOVEMENT AND COMPETITION LAW (Dorota Leczykiewcz & Stephen
Weatherill eds., Oxford: Hart Publishing 2016).
18. See also Chalmers, Davies & Monti supra note 12, at 111 et seq.
19. France, for instance, decided to create a Consumer Code, whereas Germany has
implemented all the provisions into the German Civil Code.
20. Commission Regulation 593/2008, 2008 O.J. L 177/6 (on the law applicable to
contractual obligations).
21. Commission Regulation 1215/2012, 2012 O.J. L 351/1 (on jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters).
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Regulation, 22 the Online Dispute Resolution Regulation, 23 the Food
Labelling Regulation24 and the General Data Protection Regulation.25
As far as directives are concerned, the most important ones are: the
Consumer Rights Directive, 26 the Consumer Sales Directive, 27 the
Unfair Contract Terms Directive,28 the Consumer Credit Directive,29
the Alternative Dispute Resolution Directive, 30 the Product Safety
Directive,31 the Package Travel Directive32 and the Unfair Commercial
Practices Directive.33
Given the range of areas of law affected, one cannot deny or
underestimate the importance of European consumer law for the
development of a European contract law. This is especially true as a
major European principle states that interference in the respective
national civil law of the Member States is allowed only to a limited
extent. 34 Hence, national civil code provisions, e.g. concerning
regulations on how a contract comes into force or regarding minors,
cannot be regulated by European law since the EU lacks a
corresponding competence. Therefore, one single and uniform
European contract law does not exist. This leads to the fact that
22. Commission Regulation 261/2004, 2004 O.J. L 046/1 (establishing common rules on
compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation
or long delay of flights).
23. Commission Regulation 24/2013, 2013 O.J. L 165/1 (on online dispute resolution for
consumer disputes).
24. Commission Regulation 1169/2011, 2011 O.J. L304/18 (on the provision of food
information to consumers).
25. Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. L 119/1 (on the protection of natural
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data,
and repealing Directive 95/46/EC).
26. Directive 2011/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on Consumer
Rights, 2011 O.J. L 304/64.
27 . Directive 99/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on Certain
Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees, 1999 O.J. L 171/12-16.
28. Directive 93/13/EEC of the Council of the European Communities on Unfair Terms
in Consumer Contracts, 1993 O.J. L 095/29.
29. Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on Credit
Agreements for Consumers and Repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC, 2008 O.J. L 133/66.
30. Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on Alternative
Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes, 2013 O.J. L 165/63.
31. Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on General
Product Safety, 2001 O.J. L 011/4.
32. Directive (EU) 2015/2302/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Package Travel and Linked Travel Arrangements, 2015 O.J. L 326/1.
33. Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council Concerning
Unfair Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices in the Internal Market, 2005 O.J. L 149/22.
34. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 6, art. 5, at 18.
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consumer law provisions are basically the only existing – although
concededly still fragmented – provisions of a European contract law.
Kötz has described the phenomenon as ‘tiny islands of unified law
within an ocean of national laws’.35
Lately, however, there have been several attempts to unify the
different provisions by means of analyzing and considering the contract
law of all Member States. The Draft Common Frame of Reference36
accordingly identified and formulated the common (contract) law
principles of all Member States. 37 Departing from that effort, a
Common European Sales Law (CESL) 38 was drafted. However, the
proposal was subject to much criticism39 and never passed, leading the
European Commission back to the general approach of using directives
and regulations. Subsequently, the EU has presented two new draft
directives as part of the Digital Single Market Strategy,40 dealing with
consumer contracts for the supply of digital content (Digital Content
Directive41) and certain aspects of online and other distance sales of
goods (Online Goods Directive42).
35. “In einem Meer nationalen Rechts winzige Inseln vereinheitlichten Rechts.” Cf. Kötz,
Rechtsvereinheitlichung: Nutzen, Kosten, Methode, Ziele, 50 RABELSZ 1-50 (1986).
36 . See generally PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS, AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN
PRIVATE LAW (Christian von Bar et al. eds., 2009).
37 . In 1980, the Danish lawyer Ole Lando founded the Commission on European
Contract Law that elaborated the Principles of European Contract Law (“PECL”), which had
been the starting point for the DCFR. See generally THE PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT
LAW Parts I, II, & III (2002).
38. See generally Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on a Common European Sales Law, COM (2011) 635 final (Nov. 10, 2011).
39. The UK expressed criticism especially regarding the progress and organization of the
Draft Common Frame of Reference, see EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE (HL), EUROPEAN
CONTRACT LAW: THE WAY FORWARD, REPORT WITH EVIDENCE, HL 95-I, at 3 (UK); Hugh
Beale, The European Commission’s Common Frame of Reference Project: A Progress Report,
2 EUROPEAN REVIEW OF CONTRACT LAW 303 (2006). The UK also underlined problematic
issues in the CESL, such as cross-border sales, language, the right to terminate, damages for
distress and inconvenience, telephone selling, and doorstep selling. See THE LAW COMMISSION
AND THE SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION (EDS.), AN OPTIONAL COMMON EUROPEAN SALES
LAW: ADVANTAGES AND PROBLEMS, ADVICE TO THE UK GOVERNMENT, 2011, at VIII-XI (UK)
(offering a rather positive evaluation at the end).
40. European Commission, A Digital Single Market for Europe (July 2, 2017), available
at: https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/publications/digital-single-market-two-years_en.
41. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Certain
Aspects Concerning Contracts for the Supply of Digital Content, COM (2015) 634 final (Sep.
12, 2015).
42. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Certain
Aspects Concerning Contracts for the Online and Other Distance Sales of Goods, COM (2015)
635 final (Sep.12, 2015).
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B. Consumer Law Regulations and Directions
As far as Brexit is concerned, a number of provisions will be
subjected to major changes. Primary law itself is covered by Art. 50
Subsection 3 TEU and will cease to be applicable to the UK two years
after its withdrawal. However, Art. 50 TEU only states that by not
applying EU law and its principles anymore, the ‘former’ Member
State will not infringe any EU provisions. Consequently, whether the
provisions of a regulation or directive will still be applicable in the
future must be decided by the UK government and formally approved
by its Parliament.43
With regard to regulations, the binding force and the scope of
application will end no later than the end of the two-year period.44 On
the national level, the adopted European Communities Act 1972, 45
once implemented to ensure the primacy of application of EU law,46
will have to be overruled by a new Act of Parliament. This new Act
will form the core of Brexit, since a lot of details will need to be
included.47 Although lately a considerable amount of regulations has
been passed, most parts of consumer law typically consist of directives;
hence, the respective provisions are already part of the UK’s national
law, primarily implemented through UK statutory instruments.48 Any
changes after a Brexit are consequently in the hands of British
legislators. Therefore, with a reform of the current legal basis, changes
in national law are also to be expected. The individual drafting of new
legislation probably depends on further bilateral agreements, these
having the EU or the individual remaining Member States on the one
side and the UK on the other.
C. The Role of the European Court of Justice
In this fragmented legal environment, the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU) has an important role within the institutional
structure of the EU, since it is its highest court. Through its judgments,
the CJEU ensures, on the one hand, the uniform interpretation of EU
43. Basedow, Brexit und das Private- und Wirtschaftsrecht, 25 ZEUP 567, 570 (2016).
44. TFEU, supra note 6, art. 50, at 43.
45. See generally European Communities Act 1972, c. 68.
46 . TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 6, art. 4, at 18; Costa v. ENEL, Case 6-6/64,
[1964] E.C.R. I-1251.
47 . McMillan, The Impact of Brexit upon English Contract Law, 27 KING’S LAW
JOURNAL 420, 424 (2016).
48. Id. at 423
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law for every Member State and, on the other, the compliance of
Member States and EU institutions with EU law.
Therefore, by deciding on questions of interpretation, the CJEU
constitutes a part of the constant process of harmonization of law. The
primacy of the interpretation of European legislative acts serves to
guarantee this process. Art. 267 TFEU introduces the important
procedure of preliminary rulings. National courts of EU Member States
are obliged to ensure the proper application of EU law. In case of
doubts regarding the interpretation of European legislative acts, every
court of a Member State can request the CJEU to give clarification on
the interpretation. 49 By these means, the CJEU also enhances legal
certainty. When it comes to directives, not only the transposition of a
directive but also the uniform application of the transposed law can
thereby be achieved.
III. THE UK WITHOUT THE EU/THE EU WITHOUT THE UK
As stated above, UK consumer law is strongly connected with EU
law. Therefore, no major changes are expected for now, given that
triggering Art. 50 TEU only serves to start the two-year transition
period. At the moment, consumer law in the UK conforms to the EU
standards and provisions, including its interpretation by the CJEU.
In the following section of the paper we will look at some areas
of consumer law which are currently of great importance, and we will
analyze the possible impact of Brexit on them. We suggest grouping
those areas into three different categories: (1) provisions which will
likely remain unaffected; (2) provisions where the UK always had a
different point of view than most other Member States and where
therefore Brexit will most likely lead to changes in both UK law as well
as European provisions and (3) areas where new developments in the
UK might serve as a role model for European provisions.
A. Enduring Provisions
It is arguably simplest to start with areas in which changes are
unlikely. To identify provisions which will remain mostly unaffected,
we assume that this will be the case in either provisions which (a) have
strong ties with other States and will thus have a potential to raise
conflicts or (b) which were initiated by the UK and have respectively
49.

TFEU, supra note 6, art. 267, at 164.
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been incorporated in British law without major concerns. We will
briefly introduce two possible areas.
1. Air Passenger Rights
An important example of such an area is the Air Passengers Rights
Regulation. This regulation provides rights for air passengers in cases
of denied boarding, cancellation and a delay of the flight. 50 The
perpetuation of the current rules may be assumed given the
international importance of the subject matter – cancelled or delayed
flights are primarily of concern with regard to long-distance travel.
Moreover, the regulation has a wide scope of applicability: Art. 3 states
that the regulation applies also to non-EU carriers that depart from an
airport of a Member State. Given this wide scope of applicability,
autonomous provisions on a national basis after Brexit seem rather
impracticable. From a technical point of view, however, one has to note
that the regulation has to be adopted into UK national law after Brexit
as it will no longer be directly applicable.
2. Product Liability
Product liability in the UK is regulated in the Consumer
Protection Act 1987. 51 The Act implemented the Product Liability
Directive,52 which introduced a regime of strict liability for damage
arising from defective products. The provision is 30 years old and
forms an enduring part of the UK’s national law, remaining untouched
by any legal reform during all the years subsequent to its enactment.53
50. Bruggen, European air passenger rights: the concept of “flight”, 3 EUVR 2014, 233250.
51. See generally Consumer Protection Act 1987, 1987 Chapter 43, available at:
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1987/43 (UK).
52. See generally The Council of the European Communities, Council Directive
85/374/EEC,
(1985)
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
CELEX:31985L0374:en:HTML.
53. The UK was the first Member State to implement the Product Liability Directive. Since
the introduced concept of strict liability was unknown to the UK’s legal system, it provoked a
rather ‘strong response’ from the UK (see HOWELLS & WEATHERILL, CONSUMER PROTECTION
LAW 234 (Oxford, 2nd ed. 2005); Mc Kenna & Co, Report for the Commission of the European
Communities on the Application of Directive 85/374/EEC on Liability for Defective Products,
p. 1, 4, Commission of the European Communities Report, (Aug. 20 1992). In that respect, the
European Court of Justice reviewed the wording of the development risks defense in the
Consumer Protection Act 1987 but held in favor of the UK’s implementation, , Case C-300/95,
Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland.
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Hence, a change regarding any requirements or legal consequences
seems unlikely. Any other approach would increase legal uncertainty
and put both UK businesses and remaining EU businesses under
enormous pressure. Additionally, it can be fairly comfortably
concluded that product liability will not be one of the most urgent
issues that will arise and be addressed during Brexit negotiations. Since
the system is implemented and working, there seems to be no need in
changing it.
B. Areas Where Changes are Likely to be Expected
Even though describing future changes is like ‘reading tea leaves’,
in some areas the UK particularly struggled with the transposition of
EU legislation into the national legal system. In contrast to the above
discussed areas, we assume that changes are likely to expect as far as
concepts have been introduced which deviated from British legal
standards or have been generally unknown before. In those areas it is
possible that the future construction and application of legal concepts
inspired by EU law will revert to the genuinely national concepts.
Especially if we consider that Brexit is about regaining ‘national
sovereignty’ – which it is in the mindset of the ‘Leave’ campaign –54
emphasizing common law and constructing provisions in a rather
‘British’ way might be at least a possible option for conservative
judges. Obvious areas in this context are the notion of the ‘consumer
benchmark’ as well as the concept of ‘good faith’ in both the law of
unfair contract terms and also unfair commercial practices law.
1. Consumer Benchmark
The question of how consumers are perceived in the eyes of the
law – and what expectations they have to live up to – remains one of
the key points in consumer law. The benchmark of the average
consumer 55 has been introduced and constantly developed in
judgments of the CJEU, who defined the European consumer as
54. The ‘Leave’ campaign was advertised with slogans as ‘Vote Leave, take back control’
and statements as ‘The European Court already overrules us on everything from how much tax
we pay, to who we can let in and out of the country, and on what terms’ showing that they
believe the EU threatens or reduces the sovereignty of the British people; materials available at
e.g. http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/why_vote_leave.html.
55. See Leczykiewicz & Weatherill, The Images of the Consumer in EU Law, in THE
IMAGES OF THE CONSUMER IN EU LAW: LEGISLATION, FREE MOVEMENT AND COMPETITION
LAW 1, 8, (Dorota Leczykiewcz & Stephen Weatherill eds., Oxford: Hart Publishing 2016).
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rational and confident. The Court’s jurisprudence states that consumers
are considered to be reasonably well-informed, reasonably observant
and circumspect. 56 The consumer benchmark thereby follows an
approach that is based on the information paradigm – focusing on the
enormous relevance of information within consumer protection law. It
has been developed in terms of unfair commercial practices 57 and
consequently has had to be transposed into other aspects of consumer
law. 58 Thus, European consumer law generally is premised on the
rational and confident consumer when it comes to consumer protection
and its legal structuring. Nevertheless, how a court in one of the 28
Member States defines ‘rational’ may differ.
Different occasions have shown that, under the consumer
benchmark in the UK, the rational and average consumer is very well
informed and able to act autonomously – and hence in less need of
protection.59 The following case60 may serve as an illustrative example:
British Airways sued Ryanair for trademark infringement and
malicious falsehood in respect of a comparative press advertisement
released by Ryanair.61 The advertisement referred primarily to the price
difference between the two airlines regarding their flights to several
explicitly named airports. However, although named in the same
manner, it was not mentioned that British Airways offered their flights
to the main airports whereas Ryanair used smaller airports in the same
region that were not as close to the specific cities at issue. The British
High Court ruled that the average and reasonable consumer could be
expected to be well informed and would therefore not be misled by the
comparison of prices in relation to two different airports.
By contrast, in Germany for example, the rational consumer was
considered to need significantly more protection. Several courts had to
deal with a comparable situation to that of British Airways v Ryanair.
56. See generally Verein gegen Unwesen in Handel und Gewerbe Koln eV v. Mars GmbH,
Case C-470/93; Gut Springenheide and Rudolf Tusky v. Oberkreisdirektor des Kreises SteinfurtAmt fur Lebensmitteluberwachung, Case C-210/96.
57. See generally Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung Fur Branntwein
(Federal Monopoly Administration for Spirits) C-120/78; Estée Lauder Cosmetics GmbH & Co.
OHG v. Lancaster Group GmbH, Case C-220/98.
58. Andreas Wiebe, Das Leid des Verbrauchers mit dem Verbraucherleitbild, in
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HELMUT KÖHLER 804, 811 (Tobias Lettl et al. eds., München: C.H. Beck
2014).
59. Cf. Straetmans, Misleading Practices, The Consumer Information Model and Consumer
Protection, 5 EUCML 199, 204 (2016).
60. British Airways v. Ryanair 2001 FLR 541.
61. The advertisement described British Airways as ‘Expensive BA….DS’.
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Specifically, the denomination of a (small) destination airport in
Germany was similar to the main airport in the same region, e.g.
Frankfurt (a.M.) and Frankfurt (Hahn). 62 The flights to the smaller
airport (provided by a low-budget airline) were cheaper, but those
airports were badly connected with the public transportation system
and 80-120 kilometers outside of the cities in question – these being
facts about which the airlines did not openly inform consumers.
According to the German Higher Regional Courts, rational consumers
were misled in that situation and could not be expected to know and
investigate the difference between two similarly promoted and named
airports.63
Although there is no doubt that the approach is based on the same
standard of a rational and responsible consumer, the courts in different
Member States apply different levels of protection. It has been shown
that the UK has followed a more liberal approach. Once the binding
force of European law disappears in the future, an even deeper
divergence in this respect seems very likely.
2. Unfair Contract Terms and Unfair Commercial Practices
Beginning in the 1960s courts developed mechanisms for
protection against unfair contract terms in contracts. Exemption and
exclusion of liability clauses, the question of the notice (surprising
clauses) and invalid types of contracts were the cornerstones of the case
law64 that originally was closely connected with the concepts of ‘undue
influence’ and ‘unconscionability’.65 It is noteworthy that the personal
scope of this case law was not limited to consumers in the European
sense. The case law was later partly summarized by the Unfair Contract
Terms Act of 1977 (UCTA), which considerably restricted the
effectiveness of exemption and limitation clauses not only in consumer
contracts but also in commercial contracts.66 The Act included a list of
terms automatically ineffective as well as terms that needed to be tested
for their ‘reasonableness’.67
62. OLG Hamburg Dec/ 19, 2002, 5 U 137/02 Frankfurt-Hahn.
63. See also OLG Köln Dec. 5, 2003, 6 U 107/03 Flughafen Niederrhein (Düsseldorf).
64. For common law on contract terms cf. O’SULLIVAN & HILLIARD, THE LAW OF
CONTRACT 192 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3d ed. 2008); Whittaker, in 1 CHITTY ON
CONTRACTS 15-002 (Hugh Beale ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell, 32nd ed. 2015).
65. HUGH COLLINS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 274 (LexisNexis, 4th ed. 2003).
66. Whittaker, supra note 64, at 15-003.
67. For details on the reasonableness test, compare O’Sullivan & Hilliard, supra, note 64,
at 201.
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In 1994, the UK then transposed the Directive on Unfair Terms in
Consumer Contracts68 into national law in a ‘minimalistic manner’.69
Essentially, this means the British legislature mostly copied and pasted
the text of the directive word-for-word into the Unfair Terms on
Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994, which was slightly amended by
the Unfair Terms on Consumer Regulations 1999.70 Besides the limited
personal scope and the extended scope of application in comparison to
UCTA and the common law, the major legal problem brought by the
directive was the introduction of ‘good faith’ and the concept of a broad
general clause. Although the introduction of this concept was seen as
presenting ‘a fascinating challenge to the traditions of the common
law’71 which ‘is mysterious and exciting to an English lawyer’,72 there
was nevertheless a major dispute on how to deal with this concept.73
Some argued that ‘good faith’ requires a test of the contract’s
substantive fairness and an assessment whether there is a significant
imbalance between the parties.74 Others saw a mixture of substantive
and procedural fairness and emphasized that the concept of
‘reasonableness’ known from UCTA was already familiar. 75 A
different set of authors, by contrast, argued that the notion
predominantly pertains to procedural fairness, as the concept is known
in German law,76 and thus some scholars demanded that the United
Kingdom import criteria from the civil law concept of ‘good faith’. But,
as always, the truth normally lies somewhere in between:
Consequently, it was also argued that it would be improper to define
the concept in accordance with the tradition of any single Member State

68. Directive 93/13/EEC, 1993 L 95/29.
69. Whittaker, supra note 64, at 15-005.
70. Pfeiffer, in DAS RECHT DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION, Einl., zu Art. 1 RL 93/13/EWG
(Grabitz & Hilf eds., München: C.H. Beck, 40th ed. 2009).
71. Collins, Good Faith in European Contract Law, 14 OJLS 229, 245-249 (1994); see
also Beatson, The Incorporation of the EC Directive on Unfair Consumer Contracts into English
Law, 6 ZEUP 957, 964 (1998).
72. Collins, supra note 71, at 245, 249.
73. For a summary, compare O’SULLIVAN & HILLIARD, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 210
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2d ed. 2006).
74. SMITH, CONTRACT, 48 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 5, 8 (1995).
75. Collins, supra note 71, at 249.
76. Beale, Legislative Control of Fairness: The Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts, in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAw 243 (Jack Beatson & Daniel
Friedman eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995).
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and, as such, that it had to be interpreted autonomously from a
European perspective and with a comparative method.77
In a far-reaching decision, the House of Lords voted in favor of
this European view on the Unfair Terms on Consumer Regulations
1999.78 They reasoned that the construction of provisions in national
law had always to be oriented on the respective directive they were
based on. This results from the prevailing nature of European Union
legislation and the interpretation of EU law by the CJEU, 79 which
follows a more purpose-based approach than British courts were used
to. 80 The House of Lords adopted this style of interpretation in its
decision by taking the recitals and legislative aims into account.81 The
judgment had a major impact on the understanding of European private
law in the UK. In a way, it confirmed the thesis that with the
implementation of ‘good faith’ in the UK, ‘English contract lawyers
are forced to become comparative lawyers’82. However, after Brexit it
is not unlikely that courts will start to interpret the transposing statues
in isolation from the directive, which could lead to different outcomes.
With regard to the Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices
(UCPD),83 the UK legal system had to deal with a similar challenge as
the European Union’s law introduced subsidiary84 and broad generalclauses,85 operating with the concept of ‘good faith’.86 Considering the

77. Whittaker, Assessing the Fairness of Contract Terms: The Parties’ ‘Essential
Bargain’, its Regulatory Context and the Significance of the Requirement of Good Faith, 12
ZEUP 75, 89 (2004); Weatherill, Prospects for the Development of European Private Law
through ‘Europeanisation’ in the European Court – the Case for the Directive on Unfair Terms
in Consumer Contracts, 3 ERPL 307, 318 (1995) (speaking of “comparative europeanisation”).
78. Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank Plc. [2001] UKHL 52,
[2002] 1 A.C. 481.
79. For an introduction, see HEIDERHOFF, EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT 16 (Heidelberg:
C.F. Müller, 4th ed. 2016,).
80. Whittaker, supra note 64, at 15-007.
81. Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank Plc. [2001] UKHL 52,
[2002] 1 A.C. 481.
82. Beatson, The Incorporation of the EC Directive on Unfair Consumer Contracts into
English Law, 6 ZEUP 957, 968 (1998).
83. Directive 2005/29/EC, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.
do?uri=OJ:L:2005:149:0022:0039:EN:PDF.
84. The general clause is subsidiary to the so-called ‘minor’ general-clauses of Art. 6
UCPD (aggressive commercial practices) and Art. 8 UCPD (misleading commercial practices).
85. UCPD, Art. 5.
86. ’Good faith’ is there part of the definition of professional diligence. UCPD, Art. 2.

2017]

BREXIT AND CONSUMER LAW

1491

liberal British approach towards unfair competition,87 Brexit might be
a starting point for a diverging development in unfair commercial
practices law in the UK and the EU.88
Especially as regards the argument that cross-border shopping by
consumers serves to enhance the EU’s single market,89 courts will need
to find other justifications for the protection of consumers. Considering
the skepticism toward this concept in respect of the Unfair Contract
Terms Directive,90 a recourse to common law concepts does not appear
unlikely. This also shows the dependence on methodological questions
when assessing Brexit’s impact on consumer law.
C. UK Rules as a Role Model for the EU?
Finally, in our view changes are most likely to be expected where
the UK already in the past expressed concerns over European
provisions. Brexit will enable the UK to depart from European
standards. By doing so the UK might also have the possibility to react
sooner to current developments than the EU, thereby functioning even
as a potential role model for European law. On the other hand, Brexit
might ‘rejuvenate’ European projects, which were abandoned due to
the UK´s resistance. The following three areas of law might serve as
examples:
1. Consumer Contract Law Provisions
After a process of partial consolidation of some provisions in EU
consumer law, the Consumer Rights Directive was introduced and

87.

Wendland, Die Auswirkungen des Brexit auf das EU Wettbewerbsrecht, in BREXIT
FOLGEN 231, 244 (Kramme, Baldus & Schmidt-Kessel, eds., BadenBaden: Nomos 2017).
88. Cf. Collins, Harmonisation by Example: European Laws against Unfair Commercial
Practices, 73 THE MODERN L. REV. 89, 116 (2010); Collins, Good Faith in Euorpean Contract
Law, 14 OJLS 229,238 (1994).
89. The notion that the implementation of the EU’s single market is to be achieved by
the consumer purchasing across the national borders is a major justification for the
harmonisation of EU consumer law, therefore see e.g. HEIDERHOFF, EUROPÄISCHES
PRIVATRECHT 9 (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 4th ed. 2016); see also RIESENHUBER, EUVERTRAGSRECHT 44 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2013).
90. Beatson, The Incorporation of the EC Directive on Unfair Consumer Contracts into
English Law, 6 ZEUP 957, 959 (1998); see also Witthaker, Assessing the Fairness of Contract
Terms: The Parties’ ‘Essential Bargain’, its Regulatory Context and the Significance of the
Requirement of Good Faith, 12 ZEUP 75 (2004) with further references.
UND DIE JURISTISCHEN
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adopted.91 The instrument aims to enable a high consumer protection
standard and strengthen the functioning of the internal market. 92
Therefore, it can be seen as an important step toward a further
harmonization of consumer law within the internal market. It prescribes
not only general information requirements that have to be provided in
consumer contracts and special information requirements for distance
or off-premises contracts,93 but also the right of withdrawal in distance
and off-premises contracts. The information requirements and the right
of withdrawal are based on two different regulatory directions in EU
consumer law. While the former advances the goal of facilitating wellinformed decisions by consumers and thereby removing any
information asymmetry between consumers and businesses,94 the latter
aims to protect the consumer from hasty decisions and gives them a
right of reconsideration.95
In 2013 the UK implemented the directive in the Consumer
Contracts Regulation, 96 and this was later followed in 2015 by the
elaboration of an extraordinarily advanced Consumer Protection
regime which included the Consumer Rights Act (CRA) 97 and the
Consumer Protection Act (Amendment) Regulation. 98 The CRA not
only brought enormous changes to consumer law on a national basis
91. The Directive replaced the Distance Selling Directive and the Directive on Contracts
negotiated away from business premises, Directive 97/7/EC of European Parliament and of the
Council on the Protection of Consumers in Respect of Distance Contracts, 1997 O.J. L 144/19,
and modified both the Consumer Sales Directive, Council Directive 85/557/EEC to Protect the
Consumer in Respect to Contracts Negotiated Away From Business Premises, 1985 O.J. L.
372/31, and the Unfair Contract Terms Directive.
92. Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on Consumer
Rights, Amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive
97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council , 2011 O.J. L. 304/64 Art. 2
93. Parliament and Council Directive on Consumer Rights, supra note 91, art. 5, 6
94. SCHULZE & ZOLL, EUROPÄISCHES VERTRAGSRECHT 148 (Baden-Baden: Nomos
2015).
95. Id. at 186; RIESENHUBER, EU-VERTRAGSRECHT 87 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2013);
critically: Horst Eidenmüller, Why Withdrawal Rights?, 7 ERCL 1, 15 (2011),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/26ef/b94e6b6c56c850827d1fca497522179fe526.pdf.
96. The Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges)
Regulations 2013 Statutory Instrument 2013 No. 3134, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
uksi/2013/3134/pdfs/uksi_20133134_en.pdf.
97. Consumer Rights Act 2015, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/15/
contents/enacted.
98. Consumer Protection Act (Amendment) Regulations 2014, https://www.gov.uk/gove
rnment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/300129/bis-14-693-consumer-protectionamendment-regulations-2014.pdf.
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but also summarized different aspects of consumer law in one piece of
legislation. This consolidation of consumer law in the UK turned out
to be one of the most sophisticated and forward-looking legislative acts
within the European Union.
Among its other aspects, the legislation creates a new type of
classification for digital content contracts and thus ensures a high level
of consumer protection. 99 The provisions highlight the enormous
relevance of these contracts in the field of consumer law, especially in
comparison to other Member States. Some of these countries, e.g.
Germany and France, do not have any manner of special provisions
when it comes to contracts relating to digital content.100 Other Member
States, such as the Netherlands, do provide a legal framework but refer
to an already existing regime of remedies. 101 By contrast, the CRA
creates a special regime of remedies for consumers that can be raised
against retailers in case of non-conformity with the contract.102
Given the importance of the topic, the EU also presented two new
draft directives as part of the Digital Single Market Strategy,103 dealing
with consumer contracts for the supply of digital content (Digital
Content Directive) and certain aspects of online and other distance sale
of goods (Online Goods Directive).104 It is certainly true that both the
EU and the UK approaches concur in some aspects; however, they also
show some differences.105
99. Consumer
Rights
Act
Explanatory
Notes,
Background,
No.
5,
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/15/notes/division/2/1.
100 . European Parliament, Contracts for Supply of Digital Content to Consumers,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/581980/EPRS_BRI(2016)581980_
EN.pdf, at 4.
101 . European Parliament, Contracts for Supply of Digital Content to Consumers,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/581980/EPRS_BRI(2016)581980_
EN.pdf, at 3.
102. Consumer Rights Act 2015, c. 3, s. 42.
103. European Commission, A Digital Single Market for Europe, 08.11.2016,
https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/publications/digital-single-market-two-years_en (Feb. 7, 2017).
104. See proposal for a Digital Content Directive: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52015PC0634&from=EN; see proposal for an Online
Goods
Directive:
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri
=CELEX:52015PC0635&from=EN; the Digital Content Directive and Online Goods Directive
are the result of a process of consolidation undertaken after the Proposal on the Common
European Sales Law (CESL) could not pass the legislation process (see in the Explanatory
Memorandum
of
both
proposals,
p.
7:
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015PC0634&from=EN).
105. Mánko & Tereszkiewicz, Digitale Inhalte nach britischem Consumer Rights Act
2015 unter dem Eindruck des Brexit, in BREXIT UND DIE JURISTISCHEN FOLGEN 279 et. seq.
(Kramme, Baldus & Schmidt-Kessel, eds., Baden-Baden: Nomos 2017).
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The differences can already be seen when it comes to the
definition of digital content. The CRA defines the term digital content
in Sec. 2 Subsection 9 as ‘data which are produced and supplied in
digital form’, but it excludes digital services pursuant to Sec.
33 Subsection 4. The definition of digital content and hence the scope
of the Digital Content Directive is broader compared to the CRA, as it
does not exclude digital services. This leads to a higher level of
consumer
protection
in
the
directive
as,
under
Sec. 49 Subsection 1 CRA, the remedies for a contract of services
depend on a breach of reasonable care and skill.
Moreover, the burden of proof in the CRA and the Digital Content
Directive differ: Whereas the rules in the CRA correspond with the
Consumer Sales Directive,106 the burden of proof in the Digital Content
Directive leads to a lower standard of consumer protection on the
European level.107
Another difference between the CRA and the proposal for a
Digital Content Directive concerns the right to reject the goods.
Whereas the proposal for the directive does not allow the consumer to
reject the goods directly, instead specifying a prior right to repair or
replacement, the CRA offers the option to immediately reject within a
short time period – i.e. 30 days – pursuant to Sec. 20.
Despite these differences, both the CRA and the European
proposal show the importance of consumer law and adapt it to the
modern developments of digitalization. The legal remedies and
systems chosen by the UK are not at all unsuitable approaches, giving
the consumer indeed a wide field of options. Some of the terms even

106. See Council Directive 1999/44, art. 4, 1999 O.J. (L 171) 12 (EC) The Consumer
Sales Directive, which deals with contracts in regards to consumer goods between a consumer
as a buyer and a seller as a business, provides for the rights of consumers where the goods are
not in conformity with the contract.
107. Art. 5 Subsection 3 of the Consumer Sales Directive shifts the burden of proof,
stating that non-conformity of the goods is presumed to have existed at the time of delivery, but
only where the non-conformity becomes apparent within a time period of six months after the
delivery of the goods. See Council Directive 1999/44/EC, art. 5 § 3, 1999 O.J. (L 171) 12 (EC).
Sec. 42 Subsection 9 CRA states that digital content that does not conform to the contract within
a period of six months is presumed to have been supplied as not conforming to the contract. See
Consumer Rights Act 2015, c. 15, § 42(9) (U.K.). In contrast, Art. 9 of the Digital Content
Directive shifts the burden of proof to the supplier but does not contain any presumption at all.
See Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Certain Aspects Concerning Contracts for the Supply of Digital Content, at art. 9, COM (2015)
634 final (Sep. 21, 2015).
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provide a higher consumer protection level as compared to the two draft
directives.
2. Privacy Law
As technological progress rapidly develops and new innovations
flood the existing market every day, data protection has become a
critically important political issue. Due to the fact that people are
encouraged to pay with their data instead of money,108 data protection
needs to be regulated in a globalized context. The groundbreaking
decisions of the CJEU regarding Facebook109 and Google Spain110 also
impact the relations between the EU and the United States of America
(US), and after a Brexit they will also effect relations with the UK as a
national player. For the first time, the Court established in the Google
Spain decision the so-called ‘right to be forgotten’.111 This crucial step
towards more consumer protection in the field of data protection law
was followed by massive legal discussions and led to further initiatives
regarding the development of a uniform European privacy law. The
recently established rights were further strengthened because the CJEU
repealed in its Facebook decision the ‘safe harbor agreement’ between
the European Commission and the US. Since the CJEU found the gap
between the respective protection standards of the EU and the US to be
substantive, the agreement is now in the process of re-negotiation.112
Not only did the standard of privacy law change within less than one
year, one of Europe´s most important trading partners, the US, was also
deeply affected. The involved companies had to change their storage
policy, and, up to now, Facebook has been trying to cope with the
responsibility of enabling users to delete (and by this we mean
permanently delete) data that they do not want to remain in the internet.
In order to minimize the enormous impact of these decisions for
the European Member States, the new General Data Protection
108. See Kerber, Digital Markets, Data and Privacy: Competition Law, Consumer Law
and Data Protection, 65 GRUR INT. 639 (2016).
109. See Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner, Case C-362/14, 2015, available at:
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:62014CJ0362.
110. See Google Spain SL v. Angencia Espanola de proteccion de Datos (AEPD), Case
C-131/12, 2014, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%
3A62012CJ0131.
111. Id. See also Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 364/1, arts.
7-8, 2000 O.J. C 2000.
112. Skouris, Leitlinien der Rechtsprechung des EuGH zum Datenschutz, 35 NVWZ
1359, 1363 (2016).
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Regulation will come into force on 25 May 2018. Given the short timeperiod, it seems likely that the regulation’s scope of application will
also include the UK, at least for the moment. Theoretically, a different
data protection regime after Brexit is possible. Notwithstanding that, it
seems to be more reasonable to keep the same standard in order to
improve and ensure the enforcement of a single level of data protection.
Businesses are therefore encouraged to adopt the necessary changes to
ensure conformity with current legal provisions.113
As today’s world cannot be imagined without millions of data
processing programs sending data from one point in the world to
another each second, parallel data protection on the global level seems
crucial in the future. Although developments are practically in their
infancy, a uniform code at least for a geographical Europe would be
considered an important step. The UK’s participation therefore offers
an important option, especially for facilitating the smooth functioning
of business-to-consumer (b2c) as well as business-to-business (b2b)
transactions within the EU. In the long run, unified codices of such a
nature might also be a worldwide option. Since international businesses
have to adjust their policies regarding EU standards, they might as well
change those policies in and for the US and elsewhere, providing a
uniform standard of data protection.
Nevertheless, the legal issues in this field of law change very
quickly. After Brexit the UK will be able to decide on a national level
and hence react considerably faster to new challenges than the EU with
its complex legislative process. The chance to become a role model by
implementing innovative and preventive provisions is strong, and this
dynamic could most certainly encourage the EU to follow the UK’s
chosen path or at least consider it.
3. Enforcement
The enforcement of rights is of enormous importance, as without
functioning enforcement, consumer protection law provisions remain
merely law on the books. Unfortunately, the enforcement of European
consumer laws is rather weak as – in part due to the principle of
procedural autonomy 114 – hardly any harmonized enforcement rules

113. Geminn & Schaller, Brexit im Datenschutz?, ZD-AKTUELL 05320 (2016).
114. See Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v. Landwirtschaftskammer fur
das Saarland, Case 33/76, 1979 E.C.R. 1989.

2017]

BREXIT AND CONSUMER LAW

1497

exist. 115 It is only relatively recently that the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Directive (ADR Directive) and the Online Dispute
Resolution Regulation (ODR Regulation) were introduced. Most
noteworthy is the fact that there exist neither class actions 116 on a
European level nor a European Consumer Agency that is comparable
to the Federal Trade Commission.117
The CRA, however, not only brought significant changes to the
rights of consumers in consumer contracts in the UK but also
implemented changes in the enforcement of rights. By introducing
class actions into the law of the UK, a new procedural mechanism for
hearing competition law infringements before the Competition Appeal
Tribunal (CAT) has been implemented. The class action suit provided
for in the CRA is based on an opt-out mechanism118 similar to the classaction mechanism in the US and aims to enhance the enforcement of
rights.
In the UK the enforcement of rights in the field of consumer
protection has been changed by the implementation of the Competition
and Markets Authority (CMA) in 1 April 2014, which since that date
has the power to investigate matters and bring a claim to court.119 The
authority has been created in order to make enforcement more efficient
and effective and to streamline its structure. The CMA is responsible
not only for consumer protection but also for promoting competition
for the benefit of consumers. It thereby takes a consumer-orientated
approach as it investigates consumer issues and links the protection of
competition directly to consumers’ interests. Discussions on
developing a more consumer-linked approach in the enforcement of
consumer and competition law have been ongoing also in other EU
115. Regulation 861/2007/EC of July 11, 2007, Establishing a European Small Claims
Procedure, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 1 (EC) has been introduced by the EU, but has no wide practical
influence because many consumers are unaware of it and the entailed small claims procedure;
see also ECC-Net European Small Claims Procedure Report, (Sep. 2012), available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/ecc/docs/small_claims_210992012_en.pdf.
116. Different types of class actions have been introduced in the law of certain European
Member States. France, Italy, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Spain, Poland, Romania
and Belgium created class actions, for an overview cf. EBERS, RECHTE, RECHTSBEHELFE UND
SANKTIONEN IM UNIONSPRIVATRECHT 774 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2016).
117. For further references, see Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Federal Trade Commission Privacy
Law and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press 2016).
118. See Consumer Rights Act 2015, c. 15, § 81, sch. 8 (UK).
119. CMA, CONSUMER PROTECTION: ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE 2, available at:
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/546521/cma58consumer-protection-enforcement-guidance.pdf.
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Member States, e.g. concerning the enforcement procedures of the
Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office) in Germany.120 While small
changes have already been introduced in Germany – enlarging the
Federal Cartel Offices competence to investigate businesses’ repeated
infringements of consumer law provisions121 – the introduction of a
full-fledged consumer and competition law authority comparable to the
CMA is still missing. The CMA can thereby be seen as an important
and effective body of consumer rights’ enforcement; the rights that it
advances and its clear structure of enforcement can be seen as
significantly progressive.
The above-mentioned ADR Directive has been transposed into
national law by the Consumer Rights Act and implements an
alternative dispute resolution procedure. This means of enforcements
aims to enhance the level of consumer protection and promote dispute
resolution outside of courts. 122 Consumers thereby have access to
redress in a simpler and more efficient way. Businesses are obliged to
make consumers aware of relevant alternative dispute resolution
providers. 123 It remains to be seen if this transposed directive will
continue to be part of the national law after Brexit.
The ODR Regulation additionally implements an online dispute
resolution instrument on a European level in order to promote trade
within the single market and simplify the enforcement of consumer
rights concerning distance contracts within the internal market context.
Accordingly, the ODR Regulation has not been implemented into
national law, instead being directly applicable. It cannot be foreseen if
this regulation will still be a part of the national law after Brexit.

120. Opinion of the Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt) to the Draft Amendment
to the German Competition Act (July 25, 2016), p. 2 & 28, available at:
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/DE/Stellungnahmen/StellungnahmeRegierungsentwurf_GWB9.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2.
121. Cf. Amendment to § 32e GWB, German Competition Act, available at:
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/114/1811446.pdf (24.3.2017). The law was accepted by
the German Bundestag on March 9, 2017 and scheduled for discussion on March 31, 2017 in
the second chamber, the German Bundesrat.
122. See Directive 2013/11 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May
2013 on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No
2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC, 2009 O.J. L 165/63.
123. See id.
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IV. ‘A MARKET SOLUTION’
Notwithstanding the importance of analyzing all potential
statutory consequences and mechanisms, the final outcome of Brexit
will primarily influence the law on the books. However, a more
economic view towards the problems of Brexit might help in order to
streamline new approaches and amplify our perspectives. From an
economic point of view, changes regarding consumer law are a key
factor that will influence further trading relations.
The main task of the UK’s government will be to find a practical
and acceptable solution to all the legal problems. However, legal reality
and legal theory do not always coincide. Apart from the UK’s
governmental decision, economic aspects will shape the reality for UK
businesses and companies. Therefore, the key question that has to be
addressed will be: Can UK businesses economically afford an
alteration and – particularly – a lowering of consumer protection
standards?
Any lowering of the current consumer law standards will
encourage continental EU consumers to buy their products somewhere
within the EU instead of the UK, while at the same time also prompting
UK consumers to buy from businesses located in the EU. 124
Additionally, possible trade customs or prohibitive taxes are an actual
danger that will certainly influence the price of goods and shipping.
The risks of losing customers and a noticeable decline in sales should
be sounded out carefully by the UK’s businesses. One is drawn to the
conclusion that UK’s industry might retain a high interest in matching
the EU consumer protection level in order not to lose customers in the
EU market. If UK businesses want to offer goods and services to EU
consumers, they are legally required to comply with the EU standards.
As Art. 6 para. 1 Rome I Regulation suggests the applicable law in a
conflict of laws case depends on the consumers’ habitual residence as
well as whether the undertaking ‘pursues’ (Art. 6 para. lit. b leg. cit.)
business in this country. Assuming a customer residing in the EU, the
EU consumer protection standard would apply. 125 Consequently, a
124. The question of competing legal regimes and to what extent consumers are aware
of different legal consequences was, however, broadly debated in context of the Common
European Sales Law. See e.g. Dannemann, The CESL as Optional Sales Law: Interactions with
English and German Law, in THE COMMON EUROPEAN SALES LAW IN CONTEXT 708, 722
(Vogenauer & Dannemann eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013).
125. Choice of clause clauses would not prevail, if the standard of the chosen law
deviates from the EU standard (Art. 6 para. 2 Rome I Regulation); although it is highly disputed
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Brexit a would have no negative effects on consumers purchasing from
UK businesses within the EU.
The other way around, EU companies that are used to a possibly
higher EU standard might be more competitive in the UK, since they
could – voluntarily – offer for consumers more favorable conditions
than UK businesses do.126 Given the scenario that the UK legislature
decides to lower its consumer protections standards in comparison to
the EU provisions, businesses could close that gap by contractual
provisions. Guarantees and other options could be included in either
contract terms or corporate social responsibility agreements so as to
ensure EU consumers’ rights also within the UK. That might also be
feasible given that UK businesses which offer their services in the EU
and enter into contract with EU consumers will in any event – even if
UK law purportedly governs the contract under a choice-of-law clause
– be subject to EU law where the law of the domicile of the EU
consumer provides for a higher level of protection, this being an
element of EU law pursuant to Art. 6 para. 2 Rome I Regulation. 127
However, it has to be questioned how successful such a strategy will
be if only part of the businesses in the UK opt to apply the higher
standards of the EU.128
Presently the question of a divergence between EU and UK
consumer protection standards do not have much of importance as a
certain conformity of British law has been shown to be likely and there
have not yet been any severe pronouncements on the future of
consumer law in the UK. But since EU law will continue to grow and
develop, further standards and legislative programs (e.g. in privacy
what ‘pursuing’ means – especially in context of distance and online sales – it is at least common
that ‘pursuing’ means wilful behaviour to sell goods in a certain country, cf. Callies, Art. 6 Rome
I Regulation, in: Rome Regulations – Commentary, 154 seqq. (Callies ed., Alphen aan den Rijn:
Kluwer Law International, 2d ed. 2015)
126. Obviously, this is only one possibility: For EU or UK business another possible way
would be, to operate with two sets of standard terms (one for goods offered in UK and one in
the EU). However, if we assume rational undertakings this depends on how valuable the sold
good is and how big the actual legal difference is, whether they would choose this option.
127. Callies, Art. 6 Rome I Regulation, in ROME REGULATIONS – COMMENTARY 154 et
seq. (Callies ed., Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2d ed. 2015).
128. The assumption that consumers behave as rational as often suggested (and thus
would pursue their rights in court) has been questioned by research concerning the consumer
behaviour. For the UK, see in a very condensed manner Twigg-Flessner, Ability of Consumers
to Enforce Their Rights – A UK-Perspective, in CONSUMER LAW AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR
211 (Heiderhoff & Schulze eds., Baden-Baden: Nomos 2016), but this is question is different
from the fact that granting additional warranty rights or guaranties to consumers is a competitive
feature of good.
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law) will be introduced. And after Brexit those provisions will not
apply in the United Kingdom. Even if the benchmark of an average
consumer is taken as a starting point, different standards of protection
will not remain unnoticed. Businesses will (with good reason) fear a
considerable loss of customers and a decline in sales. The UK would
be well advised to follow the example of Switzerland129 and keep up
with the changes made in EU (consumer) contract law on a voluntary
basis.130
If, however, the UK legislature decides to lower its consumer
protections standards in comparison to the EU provisions, businesses
could close that gap by contractual provisions. Guarantees and other
options could be included in either contract terms or corporate social
responsibility agreements so as to ensure EU consumers’ rights also
within the UK. That might also be feasible given that UK businesses
which offer their services in the EU and enter into contract with EU
consumers will in any event – even if UK law purportedly governs the
contract under a choice-of-law clause – be subject to EU law where the
law of the domicile of the EU consumer provides for a higher level of
protection, this being an element of EU law pursuant to
Art. 6 para. 2 Rome I Regulation.131 However, it has to be questioned
how successful such a strategy will be if only part of the businesses in
the UK opt to apply the higher standards of the EU.
Apart from the legal problems that might be solved by contractual
agreements, enforcement seems one of the most important legal issues.
What will happen if a dispute arises between a UK business and an EU
consumer and the UK has bound itself contractually to the higher
standards known in the EU? Can the voluntary provisions then be
interpreted in the light of the jurisprudence by the CJEU? Since Prime
Minister May declared the UK’s intention not to be bound by any
decision of the CJEU after Brexit, the respective judgments of the
CJEU will not apply directly within the UK borders.132 However, if UK
businesses decide to be bound by EU provisions voluntarily, the Prime
Minister’s stated intention might not be advisable:
129. Epiney, Die Beziehungen Schweiz-EU als Modell für die Gestaltung des
Verhältnisses Großbritanniens zur EU, in BREXIT, - DIE JURISTISCHEN FOLGEN 77, 83 (Kramme,
Baldus & Schmidt-Kessel, eds., Baden-Baden: Nomos 2017).
130. This has, for different areas of law, previously been described as the ‘Brussels Effect
by Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. L. REV. 1 (comparing the situation created by the EU
to the well-known California effect).
131. Callies, supra note 127, at 154.
132. Cf. May, supra, note 7.
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While CJEU decisions will clearly no longer be binding on UK
courts, the guidelines and constructions of the CJEU should at least be
considered by UK courts when interpreting contractual provisions (or
legal provisions which are rooted in EU law and not changed after
Brexit) since one can correctly state that many EU consumer law
directives and regulations came alive only through their interpretation
by the CJEU.133 The problem can be compared to the question whether
CJEU decisions are binding on national courts where the national
legislature decided to transpose a directive so as to also encompass B2B
relations.134 Yet in areas in which British legal academics and courts
have struggled with the CJEU’s arguments, it is often common law
concepts that receive greater emphasis, as can be seen concerning the
concept of good faith. The legal lines there are indeed quite vague.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
It can be shown that consumer law in the UK after Brexit will
likely fall into one of three groupings, one area which will remain rather
constant (e.g. product liability law and air passenger rights), one area
where a divergence from the European standard is likely (e.g. unfair
contract terms and unfair commercial practices law) and one area
where post-Brexit changes might even function as a role model for the
further development of consumer law in the EU (e.g. enforcement and
privacy law). The differentiation between the first two groups may be
based on the fact that any kind of deprivation or loss of concrete
consumer rights and remedies will be more difficult to establish than a
change of vague legal institutions like the notion of the average
consumer.
By contrast, the exit of the UK might also work as a trigger to
rejuvenate projects that were previously abandoned – in part due to the
harsh criticism voiced by the UK – like the CESL.

133. See Gebr. Weber GmbH v. Wittmer, Joined Cases C-65/09 & C-87/09, [2011]
E.C.R. I-5295; Messner v. Krüger, C-489/07, [2009] E.C.R. I-7315; Quelle AG v.
Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherverbände, C-404/06, [2008] E.C.R.
I-2713.
134. Regarding the methodological issue of interpreting ‘excessively implemented
directives’ see further Habersack & Mayer, Die überschießende Umsetzung von Richtlinien, in
EUROPÄISCHE METHODENLEHRE 297, 310 (Riesenhuber ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press 3d ed.).
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However, even in the areas where changes can be expected on a
legislative level, the market might thrive towards a perpetuation of the
status quo in order to remain competitive on the European market.
There is no doubt that an EU without the UK will lead to a tragic
loss for the remaining Member States in many ways. 135 Different
approaches and guidelines initiated by the UK have shaped the EU and
its legislation over the years. Most certainly, the EU would not have
looked the same without the UK being part of it for over 45 years. The
countless contributions of British businesses, judges and lawyers
cannot be appreciated enough. Nevertheless, some of the guidelines
and legislation within the EU law would have looked different without
the UK’s constant insistence. It would not be wholly inaccurate to view
the UK as a perpetual ‘loner’ whose wishes and many special
agreements have caused an uncountable number of protracted and
encumbering negotiations.
But also the UK has, for its part, been influenced and shaped by
EU politics and legal provisions. The economic, cultural and legal
achievements have been implemented and have found their way into
the British society.
As shown above, it is exceedingly likely that the general
approaches regarding law enforcement and liberal market regulations
after Brexit will develop in different directions. Detrimental
consequences have to be expected on both sides, but not everything has
to be negative. In fact, a Brexit might even lead to the UK assuming a
role model position. CMA as well as the Consumer Protection Act and
the Consumer Rights Act do give hope in this respect.
Whatever the final Brexit will look like, it still means the end of
an era. It can be metaphorically described as a ‘divorce after a
marriage’136 of over 45 years. As is common knowledge, family issues
are a sensitive topic, involving many emotions that should be put aside
when negotiating what is best for the future of the family members.
Although separations are never easy, hope and faith should form a part
of all such negotiations. Considering all of the legal problems, the
process of Brexit is likely to take more than the two years allotted for

135. For a further analysis of costs and benefits, see Oliver, European and international
views of Brexit, 23 J. OF EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1321 (2016).
136. Skouris, Brexit - Rechtliche Vorgaben für den Austritt aus der EU, 27 EUZW 806,
811 (2016).
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negotiation. 137 But it can be hoped that, in the end, both sides will
overcome their pride, learning from each other’s approaches and
adjusting the respective legislation in order to achieve a better
consumer welfare.

137. Falter & Rüdel, Brexit, Anwendbare Rechtsquellen und Auswirkungen auf Verträge,
8 GWR 475, 476 (2016).

